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Singing Without an Instrument: Plotinus on Suicide^
JOHN DILLON
The attitude to suicide of the philosopher Plotinus was made the subject of
discussion, some time ago now, by John Rist in Plotinus: The Road to
Reality,'^ but I am not sure that his position has ever been adequately
countered.^ He takes Dean Inge to task for expressing the opinion, in his
lectures on Plotinus,'* that Plotinus, like the Stoics, was prepared to endorse
suicide in certain circumstances. Despite Rist's forceful arguments, I feel
that this vexed question deserves further examination, as the topic is not
only interesting in itself, but serves to illustrate rather well both other
aspects of Plotinus' ethical position and his methods of dialectical
argumentation.
Let us first consider the arguments advanced by each of these scholars
and then see how well they square with the utterances of Plotinus himself.
Inge says: "On this side [sc. the advocacy of freedom from bodily and
mental disturbance], the influence of Stoicism is very strong in all the later
Greek thought. Even suicide, the logical corollary of this system (since
there are some troubles to which the sage cannot be indifferent), is not
wholly condemned by Plotinus, though he has the credit of dissuading
Porphyry from taking his own life." He then continues, in a note: "The
authoritative passage on suicide for the school of Plato is Phaedo, p. 62,
where Socrates says that a soldier must not desert his post. Plotinus argues
that the suicide can hardly leave this life with a mind free and passionless; if
he had vanquished fear and passion he would, almost always, be content to
* This may seem a somewhat gloomy subject to include in a Festschrift, but I would prefer
to see it as a suitable tribute (through an attempt at emulation) to a master of the close analysis
of philosophical texts, such as is our honorand. I am much indebted, in composing this, to the
recent unpublished thesis of K. McGroarty, Plotinus, EnneadI 4: A Commentary (St. Patrick's
College, Maynooth 1992), who discusses the issue of suicide well in his commentary on
diaoters 8. 5-9 and 16. 17-20.
^Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge 1967) 174-77.
^ It is followed by R. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1972) 84, and, while commentators on
Enn. 1. 4, such as Beutler and Theiler in Harder's edition (Plotins Schriften [Hamburg 1960]
Band Vb) and A. H. Armstrong in the Loeb ed. (as had Brehier already in 1924 in his Bude
edition), have recognised that Plotinus envisages the justification of suicide in that work, no
refutation of Rist's position, so far as I can see, has yet found its way into any recent general
work on Plotinus.
* The Philosophy ofPlotinus (London 1929) H 173.
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live. But in 1. 4, 16 he says that the Soul is 'not prevented from leaving the
body, and is always master to decide in regard to it'."
Inge is quite right to make allusion to the last chapter of Enn. 1. 4, to
which I will turn in due course, but it is strangely inapposite of him to
allude to Phaedo 62b, since it is notable that Plotinus does not appeal to this
Platonic proof-text in this connection, either in Enn. 1. 9 or in 1,4. 16, and
that fact is actually significant evidence in favour of Inge's interpretation of
his doctrine.^
Rist, however, will have none of this. He begins (175) by mentioning,
as does Inge, Porphyry's account of how Plotinus dissuaded him from
suicide (K. Plot. 11), but rightly accepts that that is irrelevant to the question
of whether Plotinus accepted the Stoic doctrine of "rational withdrawal"
{vohi-^oc, e^aycoyri), because the basis of Plotinus' position in this case, as
Porphyry freely admits, was that the balance of Porphyry's mind was
disturbed—he was suffering from depression, and simply needed a holiday
in Sicily (from which he subsequently returned to do thirty years of his best
work).
Rist, however, goes on: "Inge is wrong to imply that a passage of 1. 4.
16 means that Plotinus thought that suicide was ever in practice justifiable.
Plotinus simply says in this passage that the soul is not prevented from
abandoning the body and always has the authority to decide whether to
abandon it or not. But this is the kind of decision readers of Plotinus should
understand very well. The soul can choose for or against suicide, but the
good soul will always in practice choose against It merely remains to see
why it will choose against."
And Rist now turns to an examination of the curious fragment or note,
placed by Porphyry at the end of the first Ennead (1. 9), and identified by
him as an "early" work, composed before his own arrival in Rome to join
Plotinus' circle in 264, entitled On Withdrawal {sc. from the body), with
which must be taken the equally curious report of the later Aristotelian
commentator Elias,^ referring to another work of Plotinus', not included in
^ Furthermore, as Harder remarks in his introduction to the comments on this text ([above,
note 3] Band lb 546), this Phaedo passage is not Plato's last word on suicide. At Rep. 3. 406de
(Harder wrongly refers to 407de), he commends an honest carpenter or other artisan for not
endeavouring to keep himself alive by sophisticated medical practices, but being prepared to
die if he cannot hve a normal life. This is admittedly not quite the same as deliberately freeing
oneself from the body, but at Laws 9. 854c he actually exhorts anyone who finds himself
irremediably addicted to criminal tendencies to "consider death the more noble course, and
remove yourself from life (dnaXXdTxou TO\i (l{ov)." Again, this is not advice relevant to the
wise man, but it is an indication that Plato was not wholly averse to the idea of removing
oneself from life. It is interesting that these texts are adduced in an argument produced by
Olympiodorus, In Phaed. 1 . 8, pp. 5-7 Norvin (pp. 46-5 1 Westerink), to air the case for suicide
in a Plalonist context. More interestingly still, Olympiodorus also adduces Plotinus, flepl
evXcrfov e^aycoyfi^, in support of this argument (p. 49, 16-17 Westerink). Whether this is
identical with the text in Porphyry's edition, however, or rather with that quoted later by Elias
(see below), is not clear.
^ In his Prolegomena Philosophiae 6. 15, 23-16. 2 Busse (CAG XVm).
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the Enneads, entitled On Rational Withdrawal, using exactly the Stoic
terminology.^
First let us try to sort out the different nuances of doctrine exhibited in
either of these two texts. In 1.9, Plotinus, interestingly, starts from what
appears to be his sole reference to the Chaldaean Oracles, given by Michael
Psellus in his commentary on the Oracles (1125D Migne) as M-q '^d^Tiq,
iva \i-{\ Ti txoMoa / i%\x\—"Do not take out (your soul), that it may not go
out bringing something with it {sc. of earthly concerns)."* The tone of
Plotinus' comments on this tag is naturally very much in keeping with its
general purport, which is that there are virtually no circumstances in which
it is proper for one to commit suicide, since it is extremely difficult to
conceive of this being achieved without some element of passion being
present, which would constitute a burden on the disembodied soul, such as
would tend to drag it down into a body again.^ Rather, one should wait
calmly for the body to take its departure from the soul. It will do this when
it is unable to hold the soul together any longer, since its harmony has gone
from it (1. 9. 5-8)—that is to say, at natural death.
Plotinus then (1. 9. 11 ff.) raises what he sees as the most difficult
situation that a wise man might be faced with—worse than the problem of
physical pain (trans. Armstrong, my italics):
But suppose he is aware that he is beginning to go mad (Xripeiv)?'^ This
is not likely to happen to a really good man (o7tO'u5aiO(;); but if it does
happen, he will consider it as one of the inevitable things, to be accepted
' The provenance of this nwnobiblon to which Elias refers is quite mysterious. Its contents
are plainly divergent from what is contained in the note published by Porphyry. It may
emanate from the lost edition of Plotinus' personal doctor Eustochius, as was originally
suggested by Creuzer. But in this case, are we to assume that Eustochius is presenting another,
fuller (or interpolated?) version of the same document that Porphyry is presenting here? We
should note, by the way, as regards the title of 1. 9, that in the Life (4. 54) Porphyry Usts the
tractate as flepl euXoyou it,a.yar{r\c„ whereas the title prefixed to the piece in the mss. is simply
rieoi e^ayoryfi^.
* It remains a mystery why Plotinus should have chosen to quote, or refer to, the Oracles
here, especially in a passage composed (as it seems) before Porfrfiyry (who might be suspected
of shovmg them under his nose) joined his circle. But in faa, I thmk, this Chaldaean reference
in Plotinus is not as uncharacteristic as has been made out. I have discussed the question in an
article, "Plotinus and the Chaldaean Oracles," in Plalonism in Late Antiquity, ed. by S. Gersh
and C. Kannengiesser (Notre Dame 1992) 131-40. In this case, I would suggest, the catchy
form of the Chaldaean phrase stuck in Plotinus' mind.
' F. Heinemann, in his Plotin (Leipzig 1921) 40-45, has some pertinent remarks to make on
1. 9, despite his basically unpersuasive thesis (viz. that this is not a genuine work of Plotinus at
aU). He argues that the notion of a soul departing from the body dragging something with it is
not consistent with the developed Plotinian concept of the utter impassibihty of the true soul, as
set out, for instance, in 3. 6. 1-5, or indeed in 1. 4 (see below). This is a vaUd point, though it
is true that Plotinus continues to avail himself of the language of contamination of the soul by
the body, and of the purification of the soul, derived from the Phaedo, even after he has
developed his distinctive theory. On the other hand, he may very well not have done so by the
time he composed 1. 9, and conversely, the fact that he has done so by the time of writing 1. 4
may make it easier for him to endorse a theory of suicide.
'" This was in fact one of the five Stoic conditions for "rational withdrawal" (cf. note 12
below).
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because of the circumstances, though not in themselves acceptable. And
after all, taking drugs to give the soul a way out is not likely to be good for
the soul. And if each man has a destined time (e'ljiapnevoq xpovoq)
allotted to him, it is not a good thing to go out before it, unless, as we
maintain, it is necessary (el |iri, oSoJiep <pa|j.ev, otvayKaiov).
All this is consistent and perspicuous, up to the last phrase. What does
Plotinus mean by that? Does he mean, perhaps, simply that one may meet
with an accident before one's "destined time"? But that would surely be an
illogical remark. It really sounds as if, quite against the run of the play so
far, Plotinus is recognising here some kind of "necessity" that might
constrain the wise man to take himself out of this life.^^
If he is, however, he certainly is not inclined to expand on it here. And
the report which Elias gives of the treatise available to him does not
encourage one either to think that Plotinus left any room for suicide. Elias
declares (Proleg. 6. 15. 23 ff.) that in his monobiblon about "rational
withdrawal" Plotinus rejects all of the five reasons for suicide offered by the
Stoics,'^ maintaining that the philosopher must await the natural dissolution
of the body: "It is wrong to take oneself out before the right time (itpo
Kttipo^)), when he who bound (body and soul together) looses (the bond)."
This last remark introduces a consideration very proper to the Platonic
tradition, going back to the Phaedo, but one conspicuously absent from the
little treatise 1. 9, as we have seen. It is really hard to know what to make
of Elias' report. Its pedigree is not very good.^^ Let us turn instead to see
what we can derive from Plotinus' remarks at the end of Ennead 1. 4.^"*
^' Of course, he may only, after all, be referring to the remark of Socrates in Phaedo 62c
that "a man must not kill himself until God sends some necessity upon him (npiv av avoYKiiv
Tiva 9e6q e7ti7:e^v(r|;i), such as just now has come upon me." This seems to relate, however,
only to the curious Athenian habit of making condemned persons in effect execute themselves
by drinking hemlock. This was not a necessity that anyone in the Roman Empire would have
to face. However, Plotinus, while alluding to the ananke oi Phaedo 62c, may be generalizing
its application, as Olympiodorus certainly does later {In Phaed. 1. 8. 3-8, p. 49 Westerink).
SVF in 768. The five were: (1) dying for one's country; (2) to prevent being compelled
by a tyrant to betray secrets; (3) the onset of madness or senility; (4) incurable disease, such as
makes the body unfit to minister to the soul; (5) irredeemable poverty. Plotinus makes no
reference to any of these in 1.9.
'^ Cf. note 7 above. It is, in this connection, very odd that Olympiodorus (cf. note 4 above),
when discussing Phaedo 61c ff., should give as one of a set of arguments (enixeiprmaxa) in
favour of suicide that "Plotinus has written about 'rational withdrawal' (jtepi t\>X6yo\)
it,ayor(f\c,); consequently it is sometimes right to take one's own life." This is on the face of it
an absurd conclusion to draw, since Plotinus' argument is entirely directed against this Stoic
concept. Westerink is no doubt right in suggesting that Olympiodorus "remembered only the
title and had no clear notion of the content of the treatise." However, it remains interesting that
Olympiodorus should have felt it possible to produce this argument at all, and it is possible that
he is reflecting a view of Plotinus' doctrine on suicide derived rather from Enn. 1. 4 (see
below) than from either this tractate or the one that Elias is summarizing. Olympiodorus' own
view, one may add, as a Platonist of the later sixth century, is that "one should not 'withdraw
oneself' in so far as concerns the body, since this is an evil to the body, but it is reasonable to
'withdraw oneself' because of a greater good accruing to the soul, as when the soul is being
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1. 4 is a relatively late treatise, ^^ and it is possible that Plotinus has
come to modify any earlier absolute objection to suicide he may have had
under the influence of what was to prove to be his final illness, but it is to be
noted that he did not in fact see fit to take his own life, despite his
sufferings.'^ If his position has changed, it is more probably, as 1 have
suggested (above, note 9), because his doctrine of the impassibility of the
soul has developed in interesting ways. In this treatise he is primarily
concerned with the nature of eudaimonia, and of possible threats to it. A
number of the arguments against the permanence of eudaimonia in the face
of various kinds of misfortune are of a very similar nature to those that were
employed by the Stoics in favour of suicide, so that it is perhaps natural
enough that this latter question should be touched on in this context.
And so it is. In chapter 7, first of all, arising out of Plotinus' point that
not even the greatest of evils should be of concern to the wise man, so as to
shatter his eudaimonia, we find the following (7. 27 ff.):
If he himself is offered in sacrifice, will he think his death an evil, if he
dies by the altars?
But ifhe is not buried?
His body will rot anyhow, on the earth or under it. If he is distressed
because he does not have an expensive funeral but is buried without a
name and not thought worth a lofty monument—the pettiness of it!
But ifhe is taken away as a war-slave?
Well, "the way lies open"'^ to depart, if there is no further possibility of
happiness.
This is plainly a reference to the option of the "rational withdrawal," in
circumstances of which the Stoics would probably have approved, though it
is somewhat strange that Plotinus chooses the relatively non-hopeless
harmed by the body. Anyone who has to make a decision chooses that course of action which
involves the lesser evils and the greater goods" (1. 9. 2-6, p. 51 Westerink).
'* There is also, I think, a significant passage in the middle-period treatise 2. 9 [33], Against
the Gnostics, but it could be dismissed as polemic, so I will place no great weight on it.
Plotinus there says (chapter 8. 43 ff.) that if the Gnostics beheve that souls came wilhiigly into
the universe, "why do you blame that into which you came of your own free will, when it gives
you leave, too, to get out of it, if any of you dislike it?" and (chapter 9. 17): "But if you have
come by now to dislike the world, you are not compelled to remain a citizen of it." This does
certainly seem to imply an assumption by Plotinus that there is no bar to suicide, but he might
perhaps be held to be making a dialectical point. Rist, at any rate, seems to regard it as such
([above, note 2] 262 n. 17).
^^ No. 46 in Porphyry's list, composed during Porphyry's absence in Sicily just three years
before Plotinus' death, and sent to him there (V. Plot. 6).
*^ For an account of Plotinus' final illness and death, see Porph. V. Plot. 2. It is the view of
McGroarty ([above, note 1] 105 and 197) that it was his final illness that was the decisive
factor in changing Plotinus' views on suicide. I would prefer, as I say, to hold that it was rather
his changing view of the nature of the soul, which is expounded in 1. 4, though his illness may
indeed have been a factor.
*' We may note this (slightly coy?) use of a tag from Homer, nop toi oSoi; is taken from the
speech of Diomedes to Agamemnon at the beginning of Iliad 9 (43), where he is reproaching
him for his proposal that they should abandon the siege and go home.
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misfortune of being enslaved as a result of war as his paradigm case for
rational withdrawal. One would have thought that one of the standard
situations cited by the Stoics (cf. above, note 12), such as an incurable
illness or the conviction that one is going mad (both of which he mentions
later, in chapters 8 and 9, but dismisses as insufficient to disturb true
happiness), would have been more suitable, especially as he remarks just
below (7. 42-43) that, after all, many people will actually do better through
being enslaved in war.^* However, it is not our business to criticise
Plotinus' choice of example (being taken prisoner in war may just have
been his favourite private nightmare); all we need to note is that he (quite
casually) mentions this possibility of "withdrawal" in the midst of
dismissing the seriousness of all sublunar miseries.
Again, in the next chapter (8. 5-9), a propos the bearing of great pain
(and just following on his notable image of the true self as a light enclosed
within a lantern when a storm is blowing hard outside), he remarks: "But
suppose the pain brings delirium, or goes on to such a height that, though it
is extreme, it does not kill? If it goes on, he will consider what he ought to
do (t{ xpTi noieiv Po-uXet)aeTai); for the pain has not taken away his power
of decision-making (to aTjie^ovoiov)." This again seems a fairly plain
reference to the possibility of "withdrawal," though Rist could argue that it
is less than explicit exactly what Plotinus is advocating. He adds, after all,
immediately after this: "One must understand that things do not look to the
good man (a7io-u5aio<;) as they look to others; none of his experiences
penetrate to the inner self, pleasures and pains no more than any of the
others."
However that may be, Plotinus seems certainly to return to the
possibility of suicide at the end of the tractate, again in the context of the
triviality of all bodily existence. A major aspect of his argument throughout
the essay has been that the true self resides in the soul, and that soul in the
strict sense is not affected by bodily or external influences, so that the true
self, once we (that is to say, our vulgar selves) connect up with it, is
impervious to the vicissitudes of physical existence. It is a remarkable
theory, strongly counter-intuitive but obstinately maintained, and it colours
his whole approach to ethics. It is behind this final passage from 1. 4
(chapter 16. 18 ff., trans. Armstrong, my italics):
He must give to this bodily life as much as it needs and he can, but he is
himself other than it and free to abandon it, and he will abandon it in
nature's good time, and, besides, has the right to decide about this for
himself. So some of his activities will tend towards well-being
(eudaimonia); others will not be directed to the goal and will really not
'* Looking back in history, one could cite the case of the historian Polybius, and even,
stretching a point, Diogenes the Cynic—as well as innumerable slaves who did well in the
service of generous and enlightened masters; but these lauer, at least, would not generally be
sages (Epicletus, however, being a counter-example).
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belong to him but to that which is joined to him,'' which he will care for
and bear with as long as he can, like a musician with his lyre, as long as he
can use it; if he cannot use it he will change to another, or give up using
the lyre and abandon the activities directed to it. Then he will have
something else to do which does not need the lyre, and will let it lie
imregarded beside him while he sings without an instrument. Yet the
instrument was not given him at the begiiming without good reason. He
has used it often up till now.
Now of course John Rist could not ignore a passage like this, nor
indeed the earlier one from chapter 7 (which he mentions in a footnote), but
he has persuaded himself, as we have seen above (p. 232), that they do not
add up to an endorsement of suicide. "The soul can choose for or against
suicide," says Rist ([above, note 2] 175), "but the good soul will always in
practice choose against."
I am afraid that I do not see why he comes to this conclusion. He goes
on (175-76) to adduce Enn. 1. 9, as if that were Plotinus' last word on the
subject, which seems rash. If anything, 1. 4 [46] should be Plotinus' last
word. But it is the logic of Plotinus' argument that should be decisive.
What can he have meant by "giving up using the lyre" and "singing on
without an instrument"? The point being driven home in this final chapter
of the tractate is that the eudaimonia of the spoudaios resides in his true
self, which is the pure soul, and that soul is fixed in the noetic world. His
happiness is assured, and cannot be affected by the vicissitudes of material
existence. However, Plotinus recognizes that those vicissitudes can in
certain circumstances come to constitute an intolerable distraction,
disrupting the link in consciousness between a man and his true self, and, if
such a situation shows no sign of a possibihty of improvement, he sees no
problem about rationally discontinuing the connection. He no longer seems
bothered about problems of "contamination" or of "one's rank in the other
world," such as exercised him in 1.9, since his doctrine of the impassibility
of the soul has made such concerns meaningless. The only imporiani thing
is to establish conscious contact with one's true self, which is the key to
eudaimonia, and which, once truly gained, cannot be lost. If the physical
instrument, the "lyre," becomes permanently and seriously dysfunctional, to
the extent of disrupting one's intellectual communion with one's self^^
and with the noetic world, then it may be set aside, and one can sing on
without it.
'' To TtpooE^e-wyjievov, that is, the animate body, or "composite" (elsewhere lemied by
Plotinus TO ovvancpoxepov) of lower soul (which is not really soul, but a sort of illumination
from it) and body.
The cautionary note sounded in the last two lines of the chapter should not be ignored.
Our instrument was given to us initially "not without good reason (ov ndxriv)," and should not
be cast aside for any trivial reason.
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We may see, I think, from all this that, on the subject of suicide, as of
so much else,^' Plotinus' position is more immediately affected by Stoicism
than by what we might take to be strict Platonism. He is certainly not an
enthusiastic advocate of suicide—any more than were the Stoics, after all
—
but, like them, he held that there was no absolute reason why the soul,
especially that of the sage, should be bound in the trammels of bodily
existence if no further degree of enlightenment could be derived from that,
or if the enlightenment already attained was in danger of being obscured
(for it could not be lost) by obstacles set up by the body or external
circumstances. The argument produced by Socrates in the Phaedo about
our being placed here on guard-duty by the gods, and our not being free to
leave without their permission, does not, it seems, particularly impress him,
though he was earlier (in 1. 9) concerned by the problem of the psychic
disruption and consequent "contamination" which seems inextricably
associated with the process of doing away with oneself. Once, however, his
doctrine of the impassibility of the soul became fully developed, this
concern ceased to be a serious one, though suicide remained a step not to be
taken lightly. Indeed, in the remark that one's instrument is not given to
one "without good reason (^drriv)" one might discern a residual recognition
that we are assigned a role to play in the world, and that, as long as one can
make some attempt to play it, one should not abandon one's post. But this
does not for Plotinus preclude the option of rational withdrawal, of playing
on without the lyre. It is a decision entirely within the competence of the
achieved sage, though it was not a decision that he ever felt called upon to
take himself.
Trinity College, Dublin
^^ I think in particular of his position on free will and determinism, as set out in Enn. 3. 2-3,
but also of his Logos doctrine, and much of his ethics, as set out, for example, in 1. 4 (though
here he criticizes the Stoic materialist doctrine of the soul; cf. e.g. chapter 13).
